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Traffic congestion constitutes a major problem in urban areas. Trucks significantly contribute to congestion
and have a negative impact on the environment due to their size, slower dynamics and higher fuel consump-
tion. The individual routing decisions made by truck drivers do not lead to system optimum operations and
contribute to traffic imbalances especially in places where the volume of trucks is relatively high. In this
paper, we design a coordination mechanism for truck drivers that uses pricing-and-routing schemes that can
help alleviate traffic congestion in a general transportation network. We consider the user heterogeneity in
Value-Of-Time (VOT) by adopting a multi-class model with stochastic Origin-Destination (OD) demands
for the truck drivers. The main characteristic of the mechanism is that the coordinator asks the truck drivers
to declare their desired OD pair and pick their individual VOT from a set of N available options, and
guarantees that the resulting pricing-and-routing scheme is Pareto-improving, i.e. every truck driver will
be better-off compared to the User Equilibrium (UE) and that every truck driver will have an incentive to
truthfully declare his/her VOT, while leading to a revenue-neutral (budget balanced) on average mecha-
nism. This approach enables us to design personalized (VOT-based) pricing-and-routing schemes. We show
that the Optimum Pricing Scheme (OPS) can be calculated by solving a nonconvex optimization problem.
To achieve computational efficiency, we propose an Approximately Optimum Pricing Scheme (AOPS) and
prove that it satisfies the aforementioned properties. Both pricing-and-routing schemes are compared to
the Congestion Pricing with Uniform Revenue Refunding (CPURR) scheme through extensive simulation
experiments where it is shown that OPS and AOPS achieve a much lower expected total travel time and
expected total monetary cost compared to the CPURR scheme for both the users and the transportation
network. These results demonstrate the efficiency of personalized (VOT-based) pricing-and-routing schemes.
Key words : Road Pricing; Traffic Equilibrium; Congestion Pricing; Freight Routing; Value-of-time; User
Heterogeneity
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21. Introduction.
Measuring the contribution to the United States (U.S.) economy as the share of all expenditures in
transportation-related final goods and services, the transportation sector contributed 8.9% to U.S.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2018) while in the European
Union (EU) it accounts for almost 5% of the GDP (European Commision 2019). In EU, road
transport has the largest share of EU freight transport accounting for 76.7% of the total inland
freight transport (Eurostat 2019). Alan Hooper (2018) found that the trucking industry experienced
nearly 1.2 billion hours of delay on the National Highway System (NHS) of the U.S. as a result
of traffic congestion making the operational costs incurred by the trucking industry due to traffic
congestion to be $74.5 billion. These statistics demonstrate that an optimized routing system is
essential and could significantly contribute to the global economy.
Drivers usually make their routing decisions using GPS routing apps in an effort to minimize
their individual travel time or cost objective. This phenomenon is known as User Equilbrium (UE)
or the first Wardrop Principle (Wardrop 1952). However, it is known that UE deviates from an
optimized road usage (Beckmann et al. 1956, Pigou 1920) and it is a sub-optimal behavior compared
to the socially optimum policy that could be achieved through a centrally coordinated system
(Youn et al. 2008). Recent studies (Monnot et al. 2017, Zhang et al. 2016) estimated the Price
Of Anarchy (POA) (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999), i.e. the inefficiency between a selfish
routing strategy and a system optimum policy in realistic transportation networks using real traffic
data, demonstrating the necessity for its reduction. Based on the idea of Connected Automated
Vehicles (CAVs) (Rios-Torres and Malikopoulos 2016, Zhang et al. 2016), Zhang et al. (2016)
proposed to reduce the POA by recommending to all drivers socially optimum routes. However,
such a strategy would raise several fairness and equity issues since in a System Optimum (SO)
solution, some drivers may benefit while some others may be harmed compared to the UE.
One of the most common techniques addressing the problem of the inefficiency between the UE
and the SO solutions is congestion pricing (Ren et al. 2020, Vickrey 1969, Beckmann et al. 1956,
Pigou 1920) where each driver is assigned a fee corresponding to the additional cost his/her presence
causes to the network. Several other works have studied congestion pricing under user heterogeneity
in VOT, e.g. (Yang and Huang 2004, Yang and Zhang 2002), the problem of management of the
revenue collected from the application of congestion pricing (Guo and Yang 2010, Small 1992)
and the impact of congestion pricing schemes on emissions of freight transport (Chen et al. 2018).
London (Leape 2006), Stockholm (Eliasson et al. 2009), Singapore and Milan (Lehe 2019) are some
of the cities that have already introduced congestion pricing, while recent studies (Anas 2020,
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3Cipriani et al. 2019) also explore the benefits from applying congestion pricing to more major
cities. Recently, there is also a growing research interest for studies related to pricing schemes in
the presence of autonomous vehicles (Lazar et al. 2019, Mehr and Horowitz 2019, Simoni et al.
2019, Tscharaktschiew and Evangelinos 2019).
Another well studied set of strategies addressing the problem of the inefficiency between an
equilibrium flow pattern and the SO are the applications of Tradable Credit Schemes (TCS) (Lian
et al. 2019, Yang and Wang 2011) or tradable travel permits (Brands et al. 2020, Akamatsu and
Wada 2017) among the drivers of the network. In this case, a central coordinator initially distributes
a certain number of credits (or permits) to all eligible drivers and free credit (or permit) trading is
allowed among travelers. Wang et al. (2012) and Zhu et al. (2014) studied the application of TCS
under user heterogeneity in VOT, while Wang et al. (2018) studied OD-based travel permits in
the presence of heterogeneous users. Recently, Xiao et al. (2019) studied a Cyclic Tradable Credit
Scheme (CTCS), where the credits never expire but circulate within the system, and derived a
sufficient condition for the existence of a Pareto-improving CTCS in a general network. For a more
comprehensive review of credit- and permit-based schemes, we refer the interested reader to Lessan
and Fu (2019).
In this paper, we address the problem of the inefficiency of an equilibrium flow pattern by
studying pricing schemes under a centrally coordinated freight routing system that can alleviate
traffic congestion and drive the network as close as possible to a SO solution. We focus our study
on pricing-and-routing schemes that can be specifically applied on trucks which are known to have
a much larger influence on the surrounding traffic compared to passenger vehicles (Moridpour et al.
2015). Additionally, given that truck drivers routinely use varying routes for the same journey,
depending on the traffic conditions (Kordonis et al. 2019) and the fact that their travel time is
already a commodity, make trucks form an ideal candidate subclass of vehicles for coordinated
routing. To this end, we consider a non-atomic game theoretic model whose users are the truck
drivers and their demand is assumed to be stochastic (Kordonis et al. 2019). In the case where the
planning horizon is split into discrete non-overlapping time intervals and the drivers choose both
their OD pair as well as their desired departure time interval, Papadopoulos et al. (2019a,b) derived
sufficient conditions for the existence of revenue-neutral (budget balanced) and Pareto-improving
pricing schemes that can additionally provide individual incentives to the drivers to truthfully
declare their desired departure time. In this work, we take into account the user heterogeneity in the
VOT. For the single OD case, using a bottleneck model (Vickrey 1969) and assuming two classes
of users with distinct VOT, Sun et al. (2020) explored the possibility of adopting the instrument
of incentives to shift commuters departure times in a single morning bottleneck situation. For
the fixed demand case, Guo and Yang (2010) derived sufficient conditions for the existence of
4Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral pricing schemes. However, since they could not find a way
to identify the VOT of each user, they proposed class-anonymous pricing schemes based on the
idea of Congestion Pricing with Uniform Revenue Refunding (CPURR).
(Zheng and Geroliminis 2020) and (Zheng et al. 2016) argued that VOT-based pricing schemes
can increase the feasibility of implementation since they take into account the vulnerable user
groups. However, most of the existing literature, e.g. (Liu and Nie 2017, Tian et al. 2013), makes
assumptions about the distribution that the VOT of the drivers might follow and to the best of
our knowledge, no self-reporting scheme where the users directly report their VOT to a central
authority has been previously proposed. Note that under such a scheme, it would be important to
provide incentives to the users to truthfully report their VOT in order to avoid the exploitability of
the mechanism. This is mainly because many users would be willing to declare a high VOT in order
to be assigned to the fastest possible route. In this work, we design a coordination mechanism for
the truck drivers where the central coordinator asks the users to declare their desired OD pair and
additionally pick their VOT from a set of N available options. Under this structure, we prove the
existence of Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral pricing schemes that can additionally provide
incentives to the drivers to truthfully declare their VOT. This additional information enables us
to design personalized (VOT-based) pricing-and-routing schemes. More specifically, we propose
an Optimum Pricing Scheme (OPS) that can be calculated by solving a nonconvex optimization
problem. To reduce the computational time needed to calculate the OPS, we propose a second
pricing-and-routing scheme called Approximately Optimum Pricing Scheme (AOPS) and we prove
that it satisfies the desired properties. The simulation experiments demonstrate that both OPS
and AOPS provide a much lower expected total travel time and expected total monetary cost to
the users compared to the CPURR scheme, while concurrently approaching the SO solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model used and we
formulate the User Equilibrium (UE) and the System Optimum (SO) problems. In Section 3, we
present the Optimum Pricing Scheme (OPS) and the Approximately Optimum Pricing Scheme
(AOPS) and we additionally formulate the CPURR scheme in the form of an optimization problem
with complementarity constraints. In Section 4, the simulation results of our approach are provided
while in Section 5, we present the Conclusion of this work.
2. Problem Formulation.
Let G= (V,L) denote a transportation network, where V is the set of nodes and L is the set of
links in the network. Let ClT (Xlp,XlT (α)) be a known nonlinear function representing the travel
time of a truck driver traversing road segment l when there exist Xlp passenger vehicles and XlT (α)
trucks on it, where α is a set of variables defined as follows:
α= {αjw,r :w= 1, . . . ,N, j = 1, . . . , v, r ∈Rj} (1)
5where j is the index corresponding to a specific Origin-Destination (OD) pair, w is the index
corresponding to a class of users with VOT sw, r ∈Rj denotes a specific route among the set of
available routes Rj connecting OD pair j, N is the number of distinct classes of users and v is
the number of OD pairs in the network. Therefore, αjw,r expresses the proportion of truck drivers
belonging to class w with a desired OD pair j who choose route r for their trip. Additionally, let
djw be random variables denoting the number of truck drivers belonging to the class w with desired
OD pair j. Then, the number of trucks traversing the road segment l is given by:
XlT (α) =
v∑
j=1
N∑
w=1
∑
r∈Rj :l∈r
djwα
j
w,r (2)
We consider a model with a continuum of users where the OD demand of the truck drivers is
assumed to be stochastic. We assume that truck drivers know the number of passenger vehicles at
each road segment of the transportation network. This assumption is not restrictive since passenger
traffic has a repetitive behavior during the same day and time of the week in the absence of
unexpected incidents (Papadopoulos et al. 2019a). In case they do not possess this information
and they make their routing decisions based on the probability distribution of Xlp, we can write
the travel time of each road segment l as:
E
[∑
l∈r
ClT (Xlp,XlT (α))
]
=E
[∑
l∈r
E
[
ClT (Xlp,XlT (α))|XlT
]]
which is a function of XlT only, leading to a similar analysis. Additionally, we assume that they
know the probability distribution of the OD demand for the rest of the truck drivers but not the
exact realization of the demand. This is a symmetric information model since each truck driver
has the same amount of information. A similar model was also used in Kordonis et al. (2019). In
this paper, we extend this model by considering user heterogeneity in VOT of the truck drivers.
The above formulation is used in subsequent sections to study the User Equilibrium (UE) and
System Optimum (SO) flow patterns as well as the existence of Pareto-improving pricing-and-
routing schemes.
2.1. User Equilibrium (UE).
In the absence of pricing schemes, the drivers are trying to minimize their own individual travel
time, e.g. through the usage of GPS routing apps. This behavior drives the network to a state
called User Equilibrium (Wardrop 1952) where no driver has an incentive to unilaterally change
his/her routing decision since he/she is not going to benefit from such a change.
In a transportation network with heterogeneous users, the equilibrium conditions can be either
calculated in time units or in cost units (Guo and Yang 2010). Since the equilibrium conditions
6expressed in cost units can be obtained by multiplying each class’ travel time by its corresponding
VOT, we formulate the UE problem in time units without any loss of generality. Therefore, let
Fwj,r(α) be the expected travel time of a truck driver with VOT belonging to the class w, travelling
in OD pair j and following route r. Then, Fwj,r(α) is given by:
Fwj,r(α) =E
[∑
l∈r
ClT (Xlp,XlT (α))
]
(3)
where XlT (α) is given by (2). Note that in a UE solution, it holds that F
w
j,r(α) = F
w′
j,r (α),∀w 6=w′, i.e.
the equilibrium travel time is identical for all user classes between the same OD pair. Additionally,
in an equilibrium condition, it holds that:
Fwj,r(α)≤ Fwj,r′(α),∀r′ 6= r (4)
where r, r′ ∈ Rj. Inequality (4) states that in an equilibrium condition, drivers are choosing the
route r that minimizes their individual expected travel time.
It has been shown by Kordonis et al. (2019) that there are possibly many non-equivalent UE
solutions. In this work, we calculate a specific equilibrium solution by solving an optimization
problem with complementarity constraints (Facchinei and Pang 2007) which is a nonconvex opti-
mization problem. Before formulating the problem, let us first define the expected total travel time
of the truck drivers in the network as:
E[Ttr(α)] =E
[
m∑
l=1
XlT (α)ClT (Xlp,XlT (α))
]
(5)
where m is the number of road segments in the transportation network and XlT (α) is given by (2).
Under the assumption that the demand of the truck drivers follows a probability distribution with
finite support, we can define the expected total monetary cost of the truck drivers in the network
as:
E[Tmontr (α)] =
∑
c
v∑
j=1
N∑
w=1
∑
r∈Rj
pcd
c
j,wα
UE
j,w,rswJ
UE
c,j,r (6)
where c and pc correspond to a specific realization of the demand d
c
j,w and its associated probability,
respectively. Note that since we assumed that the demand of the truck drivers follows a probability
distribution with finite support, as it is common in probability theory (Gubner 2006), we use the
term ‘demand realization’ to describe the observed value that the demand of the truck drivers
takes. Moreover, αUEj,w,r is the proportion of truck drivers belonging to class w with a desired OD
pair j who follow route r at the UE, sw is the VOT of the class w and J
UE
c,j,r is the travel time
of a truck driver with an OD pair j who follows route r during the demand realization c at the
UE. Note that at the UE, drivers make their own independent routing decisions. Therefore, in our
7formulation, given the assumption that truck drivers only know the probability distribution of the
demand for the rest of the truck drivers and not the exact realization of it, their routing decisions
αUEj,w,r do not depend on the exact demand realization c. Given the aforementioned definitions, we
can formulate the optimization problem through which we can calculate a UE solution as follows:
minimize
α,ζ
λE[Ttr(α)] + (1−λ)E[Tmontr (α)]
subject to 0≤ αjw,r ⊥ Fwj,r(α)− ζjw ≥ 0, ∀j,w, r∑
r∈Rj
αjw,r = 1, ∀j,w
(7)
where ζjw is a set of free variables that are used in order to solve the equilibrium optimization
problem (7) and Fwj,r(α) is given by (3). Additionally, the notation ⊥ means that either αjw,r = 0 or
Fwj,r(α)−ζjw = 0 and finally, λ is a weighting factor such that λ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, in the equilibrium
optimization problem (7), among the possibly nonequivalent UE solutions, we are looking for the
one that minimizes a weighted combination of the expected total travel time and the expected total
monetary cost of the truck drivers. Viewing the expected total travel time of the truck drivers as a
uniformly weighted expected total cost and given the fact that E[Tmontr (α)] is equal to the expected
total travel time of the truck drivers weighted by the corresponding VOT of each class w, the overall
objective of (7) can be expressed in cost units. The reasoning behind choosing the UE solution
which minimizes the objective function of (7) is the following. First, as also mentioned in Guo and
Yang (2010), E[Ttr(α)] has long been accepted as a standard index of system performance in a
transportation context while E[Tmontr (α)] is a more appropriate system measure from an economic
viewpoint. Second, we use the solution of (7) as a benchmark for designing Pareto-improving
pricing-and-routing schemes. Note that in order to create a Pareto-improving pricing scheme, i.e. a
pricing scheme that can make everyone better-off compared to the UE, we first need to guarantee
that the expected total travel time and the expected total monetary cost of the truck drivers using
the proposed pricing scheme are lower than their best possible corresponding values at the UE.
Recently, to study how close a real traffic scenario is to a UE, for the static traffic assignment
problem (Patriksson 2015), Cabannes et al. (2019) defined the average marginal regret as the
expected time-saving drivers have in the network if they change their path to an optimal one.
They proved that as the number of routing apps used is increased, the observed traffic assignment
converges to a UE. The simulation results using real data for the whole Los Angeles network showed
that the minimum travel time of a driver can be achieved whenever the ratio of GPS routing app
users reaches 100%. In this case, the network converges to the UE. Therefore, ensuring that the
designed pricing-and-routing schemes can make every truck driver better-off compared to the best
possible travel time he/she could have at the UE, we also make sure that the reduction in his/her
travel time will be even bigger compared to the real traffic conditions, even in the realistic scenario
where the ratio of drivers using routing apps is less than 100%.
82.2. System Optimum (SO).
In a System Optimum (SO) solution, drivers are making routing decisions in a manner that con-
tributes to the minimization of a socially optimum cost compared to the UE where they minimize
their own individual travel time. Letting E[Tp(α)] denote the expected total travel time of the
passenger vehicles in the network, we define the expected total travel time of the network as:
E[Ts(α)] =E[Tp(α)] +E[Ttr(α)] (8)
Note that in a SO solution, the routing decisions of the truck drivers depend on the exact realization
of the OD demands and therefore, we define the expected total monetary cost of the truck drivers
as:
E[Tmontr (α)] =
∑
c
v∑
j=1
N∑
w=1
∑
r∈Rj
pcd
c
j,wα
c,j
w,rswJc,j,r (9)
where the main difference between (6) and (9) is the fact that in (9), the routing decisions of the
truck drivers αc,jw,r depend on the demand realization c. Using the aforementioned definitions, we
calculate the SO solution of the network by solving the following optimization problem:
minimize
α(·)
λE[Ts(α)] + (1−λ)E[Tmontr (α)]
subject to
∑
r∈Rj
αc,jw,r = 1, ∀c, j,w
αc,jw,r ≥ 0, ∀c, j,w, r
(10)
In (10), we minimize a weighted combination of the expected total travel time of the network
(passenger vehicles + truck drivers) and the expected total monetary cost of the truck drivers.
The reasoning behind the selection of this objective function is that even though we are providing
routing suggestions only to the truck drivers, simultaneously, we want to additionally improve the
overall traffic congestion of the network. Furthermore, using (8), the first term of the objective
function of (10) can be written as λE[Ts(α)] = λ(E[Tp(α)] +E[Ttr(α)]). i.e. we equally weight the
travel time of the passenger vehicles and the truck drivers. By introducing another weighting factor,
i.e. by converting the objective function of (10) into λ1E[Tp(α)] + λ2E[Ttr(α)] + λ3E[T
mon
tr (α)]
where λ1, λ2, λ3 ≥ 0 and λ1 +λ2 +λ3 = 1, one could also adjust the weight put on each category of
vehicles.
3. Pricing-and-Routing Schemes.
In a UE solution, every driver makes his/her own individual routing decisions which leads to an
inefficient road usage. On the other hand, in a SO solution, some drivers may benefit while some
others may be harmed compared to the UE solution, providing no incentives to drivers to follow
the SO solution in practice. In this section we study pricing-and-routing schemes that are Pareto-
improving, i.e. they can make every user better-off compared to the UE while at the same time,
9they can drive the network as close as possible to the SO solution. Note that even though the
proposed schemes are pricing-and-routing schemes, we often refer to them as pricing schemes.
We design a coordination mechanism that can be applied to truck drivers taking into account the
user heterogeneity in their VOT. More specifically, the coordinator asks the truck drivers to declare
their desired OD pair and additionally choose their VOT from a set of N available options. After
collecting this information, the coordinator provides routing suggestions and additionally designs
pricing schemes that are Pareto-improving and guarantee that every driver will have an incentive to
truthfully declare his/her VOT while concurrently leading to a revenue-neutral (budget balanced)
on average mechanism. This is in contrast with the previous literature studying pricing schemes,
e.g. (Liu and Nie 2017, Tian et al. 2013), that makes assumptions about the distribution that the
user heterogeneity might follow. We should note that it is important to guarantee that a user will
truthfully declare his/her VOT in order to avoid the exploitability of the designed mechanism.
This is mainly because many truck drivers would be willing to declare a high VOT in order to be
assigned to the fastest possible route. In the next two subsections, we design pricing-and-routing
schemes that mathematically satisfy the property of truthfulness.
3.1. Optimum Pricing Scheme (OPS).
Let pic,jw,r be the payment (made or received) by a truck driver belonging to the class w with an OD
pair j who follows route r during demand realization c. We calculate the optimum way to route the
truck drivers α∗ as well as the the optimum pricing scheme pi∗ by solving the following nonconvex
optimization problem:
minimize
α(·),pi(·)
λE[Ts(α)] + (1−λ)E[Tmontr (α)]
subject to
∑
c
∑
r∈Rj
pcα
c,j
w,r(J
M,c,j
w,r +
1
sw
pic,jw,r)≤
∑
c
pcA
UE
c,j , ∀j,w
∑
c
∑
r∈Rj
pcα
c,j
i,r (J
M,c,j
i,r +
1
si
pic,ji,r )≤
∑
c
∑
r∈Rj
pcα
c,j
k,r(J
M,c,j
k,r +
1
si
pic,jk,r), ∀j, i, k
∑
c
v∑
j=1
N∑
w=1
∑
r∈Rj
pcd
w
c,jα
c,j
w,rpi
c,j
w,r = 0∑
r∈Rj
αc,jw,r = 1, ∀c, j,w
αc,jw,r ≥ 0, ∀c, j,w, r
(11)
where JM,c,jw,r is the travel time of a truck driver belonging to class w with a desired OD pair j who
follows route r during the demand realization c under the mechanism routing suggestions M and
AUEc,j is the average travel time of a truck driver with OD pair j during demand realization c at
the UE. Therefore, the first constraint of (11) guarantees that every truck driver will be better-off
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compared to the UE in time units (Pareto-improvement). The second constraint of (11) guarantees
that a truck driver which belongs to class i and truthfully declares class i to the coordinator will be
better-off on average compared to the case where he/she originally belongs to class i but declares
class k to the coordinator. Therefore, under the assumption that truck drivers are rational and
will be constantly seeking to minimize their individual aggregated time (travel time + payments
in time units), the second constraint of (11) guarantees that every user will have an incentive to
truthfully declare his/her VOT. Last, the third constraint of (11) guarantees that the expected
total payments made and received by the coordinator are equal to zero and therefore, the resulting
mechanism satisfies the budget balanced on average property. Note that in the third constraint
of (11), we implicitly assume that the coordinator incurs no cost from operating the pricing-and-
routing mechanism. This is a common assumption both in a game-theoretic context (Shoham and
Leyton-Brown 2008) and in a transportation context, e.g. (Guo and Yang 2010). At this point,
note that the UE solution, where no pricing scheme is applied to the users, satisfies the constraints
of (11) and therefore, a solution to (11) always exists.
In order to reduce the dimensionality of (11), in the following subsection, we present an Approx-
imately Optimum Pricing Scheme (AOPS) and show that we can assign routes to the drivers so
that the proposed pricing scheme meets the desired goals.
3.2. Approximately Optimum Pricing Scheme (AOPS).
For a given routing decision α, let us define the following pricing scheme:
piAOPSc,j,w,r = sw(A
UE
c,j −JM,c,jw,r ) +
sw∑N
l=1 sl
E
[
Tmon,Mtr
]−E[Tmon,UEtr ]∑v
j=1 d
w
c,j
(12)
The pricing scheme given by (12) initially makes each driver pay (or receive a payment) such
that his/her travel time under the mechanism routing suggestions JM,c,jw,r becomes equal to his/her
average travel time at the UE AUEc,j . Then, after calculating the expected total monetary benefits
of the truck drivers E
[
Tmon,Mtr
]−E[Tmon,UEtr ] obtained from the application of the mechanism, it
distributes those benefits to the different classes proportionally to the VOT that each class has.
Finally, each class benefits are uniformly shared among the truck drivers of the class.
Let us now formulate the following optimization problem:
minimize
α(·)
λE[Ts(α)] + (1−λ)E[Tmontr (α)]
subject to E[Tmontr (α)]≤E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]
Hji,k(α)≤N ji,k(α), ∀j, i, k∑
r∈Rj
αc,jw,r = 1, ∀c, j,w
αc,jw,r ≥ 0, ∀c, j,w, r
(13)
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where E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]
is the expected total monetary cost of the truck drivers at the UE and Hji,k(α)
and N ji,k(α) are given by the following equations:
Hji,k(α) =
(
1− sk
si
)∑
c
pcA
UE
c,j +
1∑N
w=1 sw
∑
c
pc
E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]∑v
j=1 d
i
c,j
(14)
N ji,k(α) =
(
1− sk
si
)∑
c
∑
r∈Rj
pcα
c,j
k,rJ
M,c,j
k,r +
sk
si
1∑N
w=1 sw
∑
c
pc
E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]∑v
j=1 d
k
c,j
(15)
Note that a solution to the optimization problem (13) always exists since the UE satisfies all of its
constraints. Let us call the optimum solution of the optimization problem described by (13)-(15)
as α∗AOPS. Now, we are ready to state the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The pair (α∗AOPS, pi
AOPS
c,j,w,r) makes everyone better-off compared to the UE, guaran-
tees that every user will have an incentive to truthfully declare his/her VOT and leads to a budget
balanced on average mechanism.
Proof. To prove the statement of the theorem, we equivalently prove that piAOPSc,j,w,r is Pareto-
improving, guarantees that every user will have an incentive to truthfully declare his/her VOT and
creates a budget balanced on average mechanism if and only if the first and the second constraint
of (13) together with (14)-(15) hold. Note that a user will be better-off compared to the UE if the
first constraint of (11) holds. Therefore, substituting (12) into the first constraint of (11), we get:
∑
c
∑
r∈Rj
pcα
c,j
w,r
(
JM,c,jw,r +A
UE
c,j −JM,c,jw,r +
1∑N
l=1 sl
E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]∑v
j=1 d
w
c,j
)
≤
∑
c
pcA
UE
c,j ⇔
⇔ 1∑N
l=1 sl
(
E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E
[
Tmon,UEtr
])∑
c
pc∑v
j=1 d
w
c,j
≤ 0
which holds true if and only if E[Tmontr (α)]≤E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]
which is equivalent to the first constraint
of (13). Additionally, a user will have an incentive to truthfully declare his/her VOT if the second
constraint of (11) holds. Therefore, substituting (12) into the second constraint of (11), we get:
∑
c
∑
r∈Rj
pcα
c,j
i,r
(
JM,c,ji,r +A
UE
c,j −JM,c,ji,r +
1∑N
l=1 sl
E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]∑v
j=1 d
i
c,j
)
≤
≤
∑
c
∑
r∈Rj
pcα
c,j
k,r
(
JM,c,jk,r +A
UE
c,j −JM,c,jk,r +
1∑N
l=1 sl
E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]∑v
j=1 d
k
c,j
)
⇔
⇔
(
1− sk
si
)∑
c
pcA
UE
c,j +
1∑N
l=1 sl
∑
c
pc
E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]∑v
j=1 d
i
c,j
≤
≤
(
1− sk
si
)∑
c
∑
r∈Rj
pcα
c,j
k,rJ
M,c,j
k,r +
sk
si
1∑N
l=1 sl
∑
c
pc
E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]∑v
j=1 d
k
c,j
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where the last inequality is equivalent to the second constraint of (13). Last, a mechanism is budget
balanced on average if the third constraint of (11) holds. Substituting (12) into the third constraint
of (11), we get:
∑
c
v∑
j=1
N∑
w=1
∑
r∈Rj
pcd
w
c,jα
c,j
w,r
(
sw(A
UE
c,j −JM,c,jw,r ) +
sw∑N
l=1 sl
E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]∑v
j=1 d
w
c,j
)
=E
[
Tmon,UEtr
]−E[Tmon,Mtr ]+E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E[Tmon,UEtr ]= 0
Since the UE satisfies the constraints of (13), a solution to (13) always exists. Therefore, we have
proved that by solving the optimization problem described by (13)-(15), we can calculate α∗AOPS
such that the pricing scheme piAOPSc,j,w,r given by (12) satisfies all the statements of Theorem 1 and
this concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 states that one can get a sub-optimal solution to the original optimization problem
(11) by solving the optimization problem described by (13)-(15) in order to assign routes to the
truck drivers and by subsequently applying the pricing scheme given by (12). We call this method
Approximately Optimum Pricing Scheme (AOPS). The main advantage of this approach is the fact
that we significantly reduce the dimensionality of the problem by calculating a pricing scheme using
a simple algebraic equation. As we will later show experimentally, AOPS achieves a significant
improvement compared to the UE and provides a solution close to the SO.
In the following subsection, we present a class-anonymous pricing-and-routing scheme, namely,
the Congestion Pricing with Uniform Revenue Refunding (CPURR) scheme. This is going to be
used later as one of the baselines in the simulation experiments.
3.3. Congestion Pricing with Uniform Revenue Refunding (CPURR).
Under a congestion pricing scheme, each driver is assigned a fee depending on the OD pair and
the route he/she follows. Guo and Yang (2010) proposed to combine Congestion Pricing with a
Uniform Revenue Refunding (CPURR) scheme, i.e. the fees collected from congestion pricing are
uniformly distributed among the participant drivers irrespective of the class they belong. Therefore,
the whole scheme is class-anonymous.
The original CPURR scheme proposed in Guo and Yang (2010) is OD-based. However, since
our approach focuses on route-based pricing schemes, in this paper, we calculate the route-based
equivalent of the CPURR scheme. Therefore, the CPURR scheme can be calculated by solving the
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following optimization problem with complementarity constraints:
minimize
α,pi,ζ
λE[Ts(α)] + (1−λ)E[Tmontr (α)]
subject to 0≤ αjw,r ⊥ F jw,r(α,pi)− ζjw ≥ 0, ∀j,w, r∑
r∈Rj
αjw,r = 1, ∀j,w
∑
c
v∑
j=1
N∑
w=1
∑
r∈Rj
pcd
w
c,jα
j
w,rpi
j
r = 0
(16)
where ζjw is a set of free variables that are used in order to solve the equilibrium optimization
problem (16) and F jw,r(α,pi) is given by the following equation:
F jw,r(α,pi) =
∑
c
pc
(
JM,c,jw,r +
1
sw
pijr
)
(17)
Note that under a congestion pricing scheme, the network users make their own individual routing
decisions while taking into account the fees corresponding to each route. Since in our model the
truck drivers only know the probability distribution of the demand for the rest of the truck drivers
and not its exact realization, the way that the drivers choose their routes αjw,r does not depend on
the exact realization c. Additionally, note that the variables pijr corresponding to the pricing scheme
do not depend on w and c. The independence of w can be justified by the fact that the CPURR
scheme is class-anonymous. On the other hand, the coordinator of the CPURR scheme who is
responsible for assigning fees to each route and then uniformly distribute the collected revenue
back to the participant drivers, could design a pricing scheme that depends on the exact realization
c of the demand. However, even in that case, since none of the constraints of (16) depends on c,
the optimum solution of (16) would not change.
4. Experimental Results.
In this section, we demonstrate our approach conducting simulation experiments based on the
Sioux Falls network (LeBlanc et al. 1975). The Sioux Falls network consists of 24 nodes and 76
links and constitutes a benchmark in the transportation research field. The experimental results
section is divided into four subsections: In the first subsection, we experimentally show that by
considering the 10 least congested routes per OD pair, a sufficiently efficient routing solution can
be achieved in the Sioux Falls network. Using this result, in the second subsection, we compare the
UE, SO, OPS, AOPS and the CPURR scheme in terms of the expected total travel time of the
truck drivers E[Ttr], their expected total monetary cost E[T
mon
tr ], the expected total travel time of
the network E[Ts] and the total objective value by varying the weighting factor λ and we show that
the VOT-based pricing schemes (OPS and AOPS) outperform class-anonymous pricing schemes
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like CPURR. Subsequently, in the third subsection, we experimentally show that OPS can be
efficiently used under both a deterministic and a stochastic demand scenario since it outperforms
the CPURR scheme in terms of the expected total monetary cost of the truck drivers E[Tmontr ] and
the expected total travel time of the network E[Ts] by concurrently achieving a superior solution
compared to the UE in both scenarios. Finally, in the last subsection, we increase the number of OD
pairs that the truck drivers use in the Sioux Falls network and we experimentally show that both
OPS and AOPS need a lower computational time compared to the CPURR scheme. Additionally,
we show that AOPS remains computationally tractable even in the case where a large number of
OD pairs is used by the truck drivers. For all of the experiments, the fmincon optimization solver
implemented in the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox (Coleman and Zhang 2017) was used. Since
fmincon solves optimization problems with local optimality guarantees, in this section, we compare
local minima between the approaches.
4.1. Number of Routes in the Sioux Falls Network.
In our experiments, we assumed that the cost of each route corresponds to travel time and can be
described by a Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) function (Sheffi 1985) of the form:
ClT (Xlp,XlT ) = a + b
(
Xlp + 3XlT
c
)4
where a, b and c are constants and their values were chosen similar to the ones adopted in
Kordonis et al. (2019)1. We further assumed that the number of passenger vehicles at each link
of the Sioux Falls network was constant and equal to the values used in Kordonis et al. (2019)2.
To retain computational tractability, we further assumed that there are 6 available OD pairs for
the truck drivers, namely (O1,D7), (O1,D11), (O10,D11), (O10,D20), (O15,D5) and (O24,D10) and
that the truck drivers choose their class among two available options with VOT s1 = 200
$
hr
and
s2 = 50
$
hr
, respectively. The demand of the truck drivers was assumed to be stochastic and take
one of the following two equiprobable values:
d1 =
[
3 4.5 6 3 14 3.6
1 2.8 5.4 7 9 2
]
, d2 =
[
5 1.8 3.9 15 6.4 2.4
6 5.5 1.8 6.5 11 6
]
where each column of d1 and d2 corresponds to the demand of truck drivers for each OD pair and
each row denotes a different class of users. The value of the weighting factor was chosen to be
λ = 0.9. In Table 1, we calculate the expected total truck travel time, the expected total truck
monetary cost and the expected total network time of the UE, SO, OPS, AOPS and CPURR for
1 These values can be found in this link.
2 These values can be found in this link.
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the case where the truck drivers use 6 OD pairs of the Sioux Falls network, considering the 5,
10 and 15 least congested routes per OD pair. To calculate the least congested routes for each
OD pair, we followed the following procedure. Before assigning any truck driver into the network
(XlT = 0), we calculated the cost of each route by substituting the number of passenger vehicles
at each road segment l into the BPR function. Therefore, for each OD pair, we could calculate the
least congested routes, i.e. the routes with the lowest travel time as defined by the BPR function
when XlT = 0.
# of routes Metric UE SO OPS AOPS CPURR
5
E[Ttr] 84493.0 82921.3 82920.7 82879.3 83817.1
E[Tmontr ] 184624.3 178673.1 178685.1 180000.0 182462.2
E[Ts] 220767.2 217258.2 217258.2 217350.5 219442.2
10
E[Ttr] 52948.7 49092.8 49088.6 49923.8 50899.8
E[Tmontr ] 116229.3 104413.4 104442.8 105990.4 111278.8
E[Ts] 165965.5 157918.7 157923.3 159022.6 162371.7
15
E[Ttr] 46939.4 44601.2 44578.9 44992.7 45712.7
E[Tmontr ] 102077.8 94501.8 94592.6 94921.3 98728.8
E[Ts] 152041.6 147283.0 147290.9 147704.4 149844.5
Table 1 The expected total truck travel time E[Ttr], the expected total truck monetary cost E[T
mon
tr ] and the
expected total network time E[Ts] of the UE, SO, OPS, AOPS and CPURR in the case where the truck drivers
follow 6 OD pairs, considering the 5, 10 and 15 least congested routes per OD pair.
As can be observed from the results presented in Table 1, the more routes we consider per OD
pair, the lower the values we can achieve in all three evaluation metrics. However, as the number
of routes considered per OD pair increases, the computational time also increases. Our simulations
showed that by considering 10 routes per OD pair, we can achieve a good balance between network
efficiency and computational time in the Sioux Falls network. Therefore, for the rest of the paper,
we only consider the 10 least congested routes per OD pair.
4.2. The Effect of the Weighting Factor λ.
In this section, we conduct additional simulation experiments in order to demonstrate the effect of
the weighting factor λ in the solutions of the UE, SO, OPS, AOPS and CPURR approaches and to
show that the VOT-based pricing schemes (OPS and AOPS) outperform both the CPURR (a class-
anonymous pricing scheme) and the UE solution. For the Sioux Falls network, the configurations
were chosen similar to the ones used in Section 4.1.
In Figure 1(a), Figure 1(b), Figure 1(c) and Figure 1(d), we plot the expected total travel time
of the truck drivers E[Ttr], their expected total monetary cost E[T
mon
tr ], the expected total travel
time of the network (passenger vehicles + trucks) and the total objective value, respectively, for
different values of the weighting factor λ∈ [0,1].
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(a) Expected total truck travel time. (b) Expected total truck monetary cost.
(c) Expected total network time. (d) Total objective value.
Figure 1 (a) The expected total truck travel time, (b) the expected total truck monetary cost, (c) the expected
total network time and (d) the total objective value of the UE (olive), SO (blue), OPS (orange), AOPS
(green) and CPURR (red) for different values of the weighting factor λ.
As can be observed in Figure 1(a), as the value of the weighting factor λ increases, the expected
travel time of the truck drivers E[Ttr] decreases for both SO, OPS and AOPS solutions. It is worth
mentioning that for all values of λ, the OPS solution closely follows the SO solution. Additionally,
the AOPS solution can significantly decrease E[Ttr] compared to the CPURR solution, especially
for λ> 0.5.
In Figure 1(b), we observe that the expected total monetary cost of the truck drivers E[Tmontr ]
increases as the value of the weighting factor λ increases for both SO, OPS and AOPS solutions.
On the other hand, we observe that E[Tmontr ] does not significantly change for the CPURR solution.
Note also that AOPS has a smaller increase rate compared to the SO and the OPS solutions. This
can be explained by the fact that as λ increases, SO and OPS put more emphasis on minimizing
the expected total travel time of the network while on the other hand, AOPS applies a pricing
scheme during which the expected total monetary benefits E[Tmon,Mtr ]−E[Tmon,UEtr ], are shared to
the users proportionally to the VOT of the class they belong. Therefore, a truck driver with higher
VOT will get reimbursed with a bigger amount of money compared to a truck driver with lower
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VOT in case both of the drivers are assigned to a slower route. This behavior makes AOPS better
contribute to the minimization of the expected total monetary cost of the truck drivers.
In Figure 1(c), it is shown that as the value of the weighting factor λ increases, the expected
total travel time of the network E[Ts] decreases. Furthermore, it can be observed that OPS makes
E[Ts] closely follow its corresponding value at the SO solution while at the same time, both OPS
and AOPS can significantly reduce the expected total travel time of the network compared to the
CPURR scheme.
Finally, in Figure 1(d), we plot the total objective value λE[Ts]+(1−λ)E[Tmontr ] and we observe
that OPS closely approaches the SO solution, especially for λ> 0.25. Additionally, AOPS provides
a solution close to the SO and the OPS solutions, while constantly outperforming the CPURR
scheme.
4.3. Deterministic vs Stochastic Demand Scenario.
In this subsection, we show that OPS can be efficiently used under both a deterministic and a
stochastic demand scenario. The network configurations were chosen similar to the ones used in
Section 4.1.
For the purpose of this simulation experiment, we ran two distinct scenarios. In the first scenario
(deterministic), we assumed that the truck drivers know the exact number of both the passenger
vehicles and the rest of the trucks in the network. More specifically, the demand vector for the
truck drivers was assumed to be:
d=
[
3 4.5 6 3 14 3.6
1 2.8 5.4 7 9 2
]
In the second scenario (stochastic), we assumed that the truck drivers know the number of passenger
vehicles in the network and only the probability distribution of the demand for the rest of the
truck drivers. More specifically, the demand of the truck drivers was assumed to take one of the
two equiprobable values, d1 and d2, as given in Section 4.1. The value of the weighting factor was
chosen to be λ= 0.9.
In Figure 2, we show the expected total truck monetary cost and the expected total travel time of
the network (passenger vehicles + trucks) for the two scenarios. As can be observed from the results
of Figure 2, OPS approaches the SO solution and outperforms the UE and the CPURR scheme
both in the deterministic and in the stochastic demand scenarios. Additionally, the benefits of
applying OPS rather than the CPURR scheme become greater in the stochastic demand scenario.
The latter result was expected since OPS provides routing suggestions α and calculates a payment
scheme pi that both depend on the exact realization c of the demand of the truck drivers as can be
seen from the optimization problem (11), while the corresponding quantities under the CPURR
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scheme do not depend on c as can be seen from (16). In other words, under the OPS scheme, the
coordinator provides routing suggestions having complete information of the traffic demand. On
the other hand, under the CPURR scheme, the truck drivers make individual routing decisions
having incomplete information of the traffic demand.
(a) Expected total truck monetary cost. (b) Expected total network time.
Figure 2 (a) The expected total truck monetary cost and (b) the expected total network time of the UE (blue),
SO (orange), OPS (green) and CPURR (red) for different demand scenarios.
Based on the simulation results presented in Figure 2, it can be observed that even in the case
where the truck drivers know the exact realization of the demand for the rest of the truck drivers,
the expected total monetary cost and the expected total travel time of the network are lower in
the case where OPS is applied rather than in the case where the CPURR scheme is applied. These
results demonstrate that OPS can be efficiently used in both a deterministic and a stochastic
demand scenario.
4.4. Computational Time
In this subsection, we gradually increase the number of OD pairs that the truck drivers follow
in the Sioux Falls network and we measure the computational time needed to solve the UE, the
SO, the OPS, the AOPS and the CPURR problems. For the experiments of this subsection, we
assumed that the cost of each link as well as the number of passenger vehicles at each link of the
network are identical to the ones used in Section 4.1. We further assumed that the truck drivers
choose their class among two available options with VOT s1 = 200
$
hr
and s2 = 50
$
hr
, respectively.
The weighting factor was chosen to be λ= 0.9. The demand of the truck drivers was assumed to
be stochastic and take one of the two equiprobable values, namely d1 and d2
3.
In Table 2, we show the expected total truck travel time E[Ttr], the expected total truck monetary
cost E[Tmontr ] and the expected total travel time of the network E[Ts] of the UE, SO, OPS, AOPS
3 The values of d1 and d2 can be found in this link.
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OD pairs Metric UE SO OPS AOPS CPURR
4
E[Ttr] 14552.7 14569.1 14398.7 14414.9 14569.1
E[Tmontr ] 32928.5 32069.0 32062.5 32021.7 32867.5
E[Ts] 59143.6 58789.5 58790.8 58802.3 59249.1
8
E[Ttr] 88248.2 82680.6 82674.6 83634.5 84542.5
E[Tmontr ] 189586.4 173654.0 173642.4 175467.4 179887.7
E[Ts] 244968.0 233638.7 233643.5 235095.5 238402.6
12
E[Ttr] 250385.9 225896.4 225896.0 241846.0 248776.8
E[Tmontr ] 515640.8 452767.8 452771.4 512739.2 507051.7
E[Ts] 571626.5 528336.7 528336.6 551031.3 567924.0
16
E[Ttr] 294608.2 268619.5 268610.0 282735.3 C.I.
E[Tmontr ] 606851.2 541086.3 540669.1 590851.6 C.I.
E[Ts] 667005.8 623699.3 623746.9 644341.9 C.I.
20
E[Ttr] 542176.0 497907.9 C.I. 525983.4 C.I.
E[Tmontr ] 1093282.2 985136.9 C.I. 1076772.7 C.I.
E[Ts] 1135858.4 1064486.1 C.I. 1104452.8 C.I.
Table 2 The expected total truck travel time E[Ttr], the expected total truck monetary cost E[T
mon
tr ] and the
expected total network time E[Ts] of the UE, SO, OPS, AOPS and CPURR for different number of OD pairs,
considering the 10 least congested routes per OD pair.
OD pairs UE SO OPS AOPS CPURR
4 5.7 5.8 33.9 14.2 6946
8 28.6 27.3 344.4 71.2 1732.3
12 80.9 77.7 1783.7 172.5 10930.9
16 155.5 134.1 14987.5 378.1 C.I.
20 221.7 227.9 C.I. 634.1 C.I.
Table 3 The computational time (in seconds) of the simulation experiments presented in Table 2.
and CPURR for different number of OD pairs, considering the 10 least congested routes per OD
pair. In Table 3, we show the corresponding computational times. As can be seen from the results of
Table 2, OPS always provides a solution close to the SO while AOPS outperforms both the CPURR
scheme and the UE solution. Additionally, we observe that the CPURR scheme is the slowest
approach since it becomes Computationally Intractable (C.I.) when 16 OD pairs are considered,
while the OPS becomes C.I. when the truck drivers are assumed to follow 20 OD pairs. As far
as it concerns the AOPS, it can be observed that even though it is not as efficient as the OPS
in the evaluation metrics used, it remains computationally tractable even for a large number of
OD pairs. This result was expected since OPS calculates both the optimum routing strategy α∗OPS
and the optimum pricing scheme pi∗OPS through the solution of the optimization problem (11).
On the other hand, under the AOPS, in the optimization problem (13), we only need to find the
optimum routing strategy α∗AOPS since the approximately optimum pricing scheme pi
AOPS
c,j,w,r can be
easily calculated from the algebraic equation (12). This approximation makes AOPS significantly
faster compared to OPS as can be seen from the results of Table 3.
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5. Conclusion.
In this paper, we designed pricing-and-routing schemes that can be applied in a general transporta-
tion network to alleviate traffic congestion. We particularly focused on the design of a coordination
system for the truck drivers in the case of stochastic OD demand considering their heterogeneity
in VOT. In contrast to previous efforts that proposed class-anonymous pricing schemes using the
idea of Congestion Pricing with Uniform Revenue Refunding (CPURR), or class-specific pricing
schemes by making assumptions about the distribution that the VOT of the drivers might follow,
we designed personalized (VOT-based) pricing-and-routing schemes where the users directly report
their VOT to a central coordinator. More specifically, assuming that the users are asked to declare
their OD pair and additionally pick their VOT from a set of N available options, we proved the
existence of Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral (budget balanced) on average pricing schemes
that can additionally guarantee that every truck driver will have an incentive to truthfully declare
his/her VOT. We showed that the Optimum Pricing Scheme (OPS) can be calculated by solving a
nonconvex optimization problem and we additionally proposed an Approximately Optimum Pric-
ing Scheme (AOPS) to approximate the solution of the OPS and reduce the computational time.
Finally, we experimentally showed that both OPS and AOPS can significantly reduce the expected
total travel time and the expected total monetary cost of the users and approximate the SO solu-
tion, while concurrently outperforming both the UE and the CPURR scheme, demonstrating the
efficiency of VOT-based pricing schemes compared to class-anonymous pricing schemes.
There are several possible extensions of this work. First, both OPS and AOPS are route-based
pricing schemes that cannot be easily implemented for passenger traffic. Therefore, personalized
(VOT-based) pricing schemes which satisfy the properties of OPS and AOPS and can be applied
to passenger traffic and multimodal transportation networks need to be investigated. Second, even
though AOPS remains computationally tractable for a large number of OD pairs, more computa-
tionally efficient solutions need to be studied. Furthermore, the extension of the current work to
the case where the planning horizon consists of multiple time windows and the drivers are asked
to pick both their time window as well as their VOT, or to the case where it can be applied in
real-time are of major importance.
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